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Abstract.
This paper discusses why running experiments in the field, outside of the university lab, can help
us enrich the analysis we do of experimental data. One of the main arguments of the paper is that
people participating in experiments, including students, do not come naked to the lab. They bring
a great deal of rules of thumb, heuristics, values, prejudices, expectations and knowledge about
the others participating, and about similar games, and use such information to make their
decisions. The paper offers a short mention of relevant field experiments, and a more detailed
look at field experiments conducted by the author, including a data set of CPR experiments run
in 10 villages, between 2000 and 2002, with more than 1300 villagers in about 220 sessions, and
replications with about 250 university students in more than 40 sessions. It offers then main
lessons from bringing the lab to the field. Also there is a discussion of additional information
gathered through different field instruments as well as community workshops with the
participants to discuss the experimental data, the external validity of the experiments and their
results, through parallels with their daily life. One of the lessons is that the greater variance in
certain demographics about the experimental subjects might help explain variations in lab
behavior that cannot be fully explained by the experimental institutions we study. Also, certain
significant differences in behavior between villagers and students will be discussed.3
"Instructions can be important because
they define context, and context matters
because memory is autobiographical”. 
(Vernon Smith, "Method in experiment: Rhetoric and
reality". Experimental Economics, Vol. 5, No. 2,
2002.)
1. Introduction.
People that participate in economic experiments do not come naked to the lab. We can ask them
to leave in the front door as much as possible, try to have them read unframed instructions that
lack or even wash out context, and yet they will be looking for clues to represent the game they
are facing with something they are familiar with, so that they can walk out with some cash in
their pockets.
In many cases our experiments involve complicated tasks, or levels of uncertainty and
asymmetries of information regarding outcomes or expected behaviors by others, which will
force players to find rules of thumb that help them minimize losses or increase earnings.
Emotions will also play a role in the experimental decision making just as they do in
uncontrolled economic settings (Elster, 1998; Rabin, 1998), and how those emotions affect
choices would be part of a personal history that might not be affected by an experimental
institution or environmental variable. Rather, the experimental design might trigger or inhibit
some of these elements and therefore their role needs be studied. McCabe and Smith (2001)
explore a cognitive model of exchange that encompasses several factors that humans will not be
able to turn off when coming into the lab, but rather will use to educate their decisions, as will be
discussed later. Their modules in cognition could then be looked at from within the experiment
but also through the context in which the experiment is run. This is not only the case for
experiments run in the field but also with students where their academic major, their prior
personal experience, their teacher or class most related to game theory, their family environment,
all will be used to bring clues about what to do.3 This approach might be found more often in some experimental papers where certain demographic
data is being used to explain behavior.
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Further, when we run experiments with people from non-students subject pools, we usually
recruit them from subsets of people that are somehow familiar with the task and the model or
question we are asking as researchers. Workers make part of experiments on gift-exchange
relationships (Carpenter, Burks and Verhoogen, 2003), managers make experimental decisions
about planning and production (Cooper et.al, 1999); Fehr/Costa Rica CEOs), bike messengers
participate in experiments where effort affects wage similar to what they face for their
performance based payroll (Fehr and Gotte, 2002), fishermen and villagers are invited to games
where they face the incentives to cooperate and defect, or the possibility of sharing or trusting at
a personal cost, just as they do when a fishing or crop harvest turns out well or not (Barr, 2001;
Barr and Kinsey, 2002; Smith, 200?; Henrich et.al 2001; Ensminger, 2000; Cardenas et.al 2000;
2002; Cardenas, 2002, 2003). Major arguments in favor of running experiments in the field are
discussed in a survey paper by Harrison and List (2003), who offer a set of classifications of
experiments according to factors such as the subjects, the information they have, the commodity,
the task, the stakes, or the environment of the experiment.
In this paper I take a step in another complementary direction by having field data enrich our
experiments in at least two ways. One, by learning how the field context in which the experiment
is conducted may explain variations in our experimental data
3; and secondly, by opening the
possibility that participants in the experiments help us enrich our analysis, given that they possess
private information researchers do not have about their behavioral responses to the variables
controlled in the experiment. By gathering some findings and puzzles from experiments in the
field lab as well as in the campus, we may expand and enrich our research tools for
understanding the role of behavior, institutions and environmental factors involved in social
interactions. 
In the next section I will expand in a simple manner Smith’s (1982) model of a microeconomic
systems by identifying examples of elements brought by players from outside the lab which, if5
accounted for, may enrich the understanding of what happens within the experiment. Section 3
will present some regularities observed in experiments run by the author and others, which
support the argument that participants may use information from outside of the lab to guide their
decision making. Section 4 presents a deeper exploration of a large data set of group experiments
run in the field with about 1,500 villagers in different rural communities that face the commons
dilemmas. By using additional tools in the field, in which the villagers also participated to
discuss the experimental data the institutional setting as well as the environment, and by
exploring some household data gathered with conventional survey methods, I will explore the
possibility of such information expanding the understanding of experimental data in these
settings. Further, the analysis of replications of these experiments with students will also provide
some lessons and paradoxes that along the previous sections open new questions and lines of
research that will be discussed at the end in the conclusions.
2. The lab and the field as an expanded microeconomic experimental system (EMES).
Smith (1982) offered a basic framework and the sufficient conditions for a microeconomic
experiment, which we lay out through the components inside the dotted line in Figure 1. I will
label such framework as an Expanded Micro-Economic Experimental System (EMES). The
individual decision which we observe as behavior in our experiments is expressed as a message
that produces outcomes -also observable- and such behavior is a function of the institution and
the environment we design in our experiment. I argue, however, that the (I) Institutions and the
(E) Environment variables involve some that are brought by individuals from outside as prior
individual experiences, or as norms of behavior that are common in the local context in which
the lab is brought to.
Still consistent with Smith, the environment, encompasses a set of characteristics associated to
each individual making decisions, and as Smith suggests, are private to the player. The
environment in the microeconomic system includes a number of agents and their preferences,






















Adapted from Smith (1982) and http://www.ices-gmu.org/
Laboratory boundary
Outside Institutions Outside Environments
Figure 1 An expanded framework for experimental microeconomic systems (EMES) (adapted
from Smith (1982).
By carefully controlling the privacy and confidentiality of decisions, and by avoiding strong
framing in the instructions, laboratory experiments have been quite successful in understanding
how these institutional and environmental variables introduced in the design, explain regularities
in behavior and outcomes, observed throughout many replications of experiments. Such isolation
has served its purpose, and responded effectively to the question of the internal validity of
experiments. But isolation has also been subject to interesting debates, including that of external
validity (Loewenstein, 1999, Loomes, 1999a, 1999b). Such question has been effectively
addressed, for instance, by the clarity and replicability of competitive market settings where
theory, field observation and experimental data seem to converge..
Other experimental settings have shown, however, that behavior can be very sensitive to
manipulation of conditions, and divergences with the original theories have created a demand for4 The equal split observed in many replications of Ultimatum and Dictator games is an example.
5 Smith (1982) discusses this issue within his Precept 4 (Privacy) by exploring the case of
interpersonal utilities, but suggests that we provide subjects with less information about outcomes of others to avoid
the problem.
6 Unless there are experiments run within a same class where students know each other and where
they may use information afterwards about behavior or outcomes in an experiment.
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new alternative models. Ultimatum, Dictator, Trust, Public Goods, Common-Pool Resource
games have shown among other i) divergence from canonical models of self utility maximization
of material rewards, ii) sensitivity to experimental conditions such as information available,
framing of the instructions and composition of the environmental variables, and nonetheless, iii)
certain regularities in behavior across settings or even subject pools
4. 
In many of these games that involve trade-offs between one’s payoffs and payoffs of others, we
observe that preferences are interdependent
5 and therefore the externalities within the experiment
open the question for other-regarding preferences playing a role in explaining deviations from the
canonical model prediction. Reciprocity, fairness and altruism are examples of better predictors
of behavior when preferences are interdependent within experimental groups. 
How these factors affect experimental behavior may be controlled for within the experimental
design, but individuals who participate in the experiments surely have had prior experiences in
related situations and may have internalized norms of behavior that could become handy when
facing the task presented in the lab. Further, participation in the experiment may have ex-post
effects that can be part of the information individuals use for their decisions. As opposed to
college students
6 where anonymity and privacy before, during and after the experiment are more
common, experiments in the field lab involve groups of people that have a better good-will
accounting (McCabe and Smith, 2001) of each other as they share the same company, trading
floor, warehouse, village, or fishing lake. Therefore, information that comes from the field into
the experiment (See Figure 1), and information that leaves the experimental lab back into the
field make part of the microeconomic system and, as a working hypothesis, should be accounted
for when studying experimental data, specially if the lab goes to the field where the boundaries of7 Other arguments in favor of running experiments outside of the university are discussed by
Harrison and List (2003). See Cardenas and Carpenter (2003) for a more detail recollection of experimental work on
developing countries and the advantages of doing so.
8 Privacy, although guaranteed by the experimenters through consent forms, cannot be assured when
villagers, neighbors, coworkers, share information about earnings and even decisions. I have observed this
phenomena systematically in many villages when we invite people to discuss the results.
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the experiment are more permeable, as it is discussed below. Guth, Kliemt and Peleg (1999) say
it well for our arguments: '...in the real world human decision-making is located somewhere
between the extremes on which standard models focus. It is influenced by the expected future and
by the experienced past'.
3. Experimental evidence of an extended microeconomic system.
One of the major advantages of running experiments in locations different from the campus lab,
and in settings different from industrialized western settings, is that a greater variability of
conditions can help explain the role of institutions in behavior
7. Some of the reported
experimental data, even if gathered from students as the subjects, can provide some light on the
kind of information people bring into the lab to help them make their decisions. 
As Vernon Smith suggests in the quote at the start of the paper, such information is
autobiographical, and can come from individual experiences, or from the local context of the
person and the others within the same experimental session. The personal experience can be with
similar tasks, or with institutions, rules or languages similar to that replicated in the experiment.
Also, the good-will accounting (McCabe and Smith, 2001) players may have about the other
players in their experimental session, can come from pre-experimental situations and in many
cases seem to be playing a role in their behavior within the experiment, as well as affecting the
updating of the same good-will accounting that may happen outside and after the experiment
8. 
Henrich et.al (2001) study 15 small-scale societies through a set of experiments and argue that
group level information about returns from cooperation in similar tasks, and integration to the
market help explain more prosocial behavior by participants in their experiments, measured by9 Similar terms exist in the Latin American context (Minga, Convite, Mandato) for tasks where
voluntary contributions, mostly in labor and kind, help produce a public good such a maintaining a road, an irrigation
system, building a school, etc. 
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mean offers in an Ultimatum game. They argue, however, that individual level data about the
players does not help explain variations in behavior. In any case, the local context around the lab
setting is playing a role in suggesting norms to the players, and also in giving clues of how to
play the game. Ensminger (2000) reports in her public goods experiment in Kenya that once
players recognized it as the harambee
9 game, a norm of more cooperative behavior emerged
within the game.
Cooper et.al (1999) created an experimental design where planners and firms interact in an
economic system heavily planned, and they had students as well as Chinese managers and white
collar workers participate in the games. They find among others that when the context was
explicitly posed as a case of planners partially informed and firms choosing outputs, actual
managers from China behaved more strategically than under the unframed experimental design,
and argue that their bringing prior experience ab out planned economies and economic decisions
induced a different behavior.
Studies where certain demographic characteristics of participants provide also support for the
expanded microeconomic experimental system. Gender has been part of the explanatory
variables to be tested, with ambiguous results though. Eckel and Grossman (1999) provide a
survey of the literature studying gender. Croson and Buchan (1999) explore the role of gender in
a Trust game and compare results by gender across a sample of subjects from China, Japan,
Korea and the United States, and find no significant differences across countries, and slightly
higher levels of reciprocity by women.
In the field, Barr and Kinsey (2002) argue that the role women play in social sanctioning is more
effective than in the case of males, and such behavior is clearly expressed in their experiments
where also women show more cooperative behavior. Ruffle and Sosis (2002) explores10
cooperation and in-group effects for Israeli cities and Kibbutz, suggesting from his data on one-
shot game anonymous cooperation experiments that Kibbutz members were more likely to
cooperate with another anonymous member of a Kibbutz than with an anonymous person from
the city. However, he finds that the longer the person has stayed within a Kibbutz, the less level
of cooperation is observed with another fellow Kibbutz member.
Accounting for the particular major of the student participating has also been a focus of attention.
Early experiments in the 1980s asked whether economics majors showed higher levels of
free-riding with modest strong results (Gerald Marwell and Ruth E. Ames, 1980; R. Mark Isaac
et al., 1985, reported in Ledyard, 1995).  More recently, Charles Cadsby and Elizabeth Maynes
(1998) reported that nurses showed higher levels of cooperation than economics and business
students in a threshold public goods game. These results would also be consistent with the work
by Robert H. Frank et al. (1993) on the behavior of economics majors being closer to game
theoretical predictions.  In another study, Axel   conducted an experiment with a unique
opportunity historically by observing behavior of university students in a now unified Germany,
but taking into account that some of them were raised at one or the other side of the Berlin wall.
They found that East German participants behaved less cooperatively than West German ones in
both public goods (ten rounds, 5 person) and solidarity (one-shot, 3 person) games, and attribute
this to students raised in East Germany being raised at the end of a centrally but inefficient
economic system where opportunistic behavior regarding public goods was more frequent.
Peter Kollock (1998) provides data from a set of prisoner￿s dilemma experiments studying how
group identity has a direct effect on cooperative behavior. The behavior of college students
changed depending on the information they received about the other players (being from the
same fraternity, from any other fraternity, from the same campus, from another campus, from the
police department).  Significant changes in behavior were found consistent with the existence of
strong in-group/out-group effects (see John Orbell et al., 1988).
Previous experiments in the field conducted by the author also provide support for the arguments11
discussed before. Group composition and task experience were found to be associated with
experimental outcomes in a a set of experiments where groups of eight participants went to a
sequence of non-communication and then face-to-face communication rounds in a CPR
experiment. In Cardenas (2000) I show that the fraction of players that reported an extractive
activity (e.g. fishing, wood logging) as main economic activity was positively correlated (Pearson
coefficient = 0.5732, p-value=0,0832) with the gains in group efficiency achieved in the
communication stage as compared to the previous stage. Likewise, the fraction of players
reporting land as their main income source, was negatively correlated (pearson = -0,7156, p-
value=0,0200) with the same group level outcome. Also, in Cardenas (2002, 2003) an
exploration at group and individual levels of how the actual wealth of the participants may
explain the willingness to cooperate in the experiment, and how wealth inequality within groups
seemed to constrain the possibilities of the group to increase social efficiency through
communication. 
Notice that in these experiments involving group externalities, individuals face a more difficult
task in the sense that there is uncertainty regarding the behavior of others in their group, and a
wider set of possible outcomes which depend on a non-linear payoffs function, as opposed to
Ultimatum or Dictator games where the range of choices are simpler and there is more
information about the distribution of possible outcomes. Experience in previous similar tasks,
suggest our audio and video data from these experiments, seem to guide the behavior and
agreements during the communication rounds, but also the prior information they have about
themselves and others in the group may enhance or inhibit the willingness to cooperate as it
seems to be used to administer the good-will accounting they have about the others and therefore
judge their best response in the next round.
4. Lessons and paradoxes from cooperation experiments in the field.
A closer to look to some experimental data from the field and the campus labs will offer more
detailed evidence suggesting the existence of such relationships between the basic microsystem12
and the field context of the participants which form the expanded microeconomic system. In
some cases the relationships are clear explanatory variables of experimental behavior observed,
but in others the relationship is more of a puzzle to be explored.
a. One first puzzle: hyper-fair offers in ultimatum games with the strategy method
One of the advantages of the strategic method in experiments such as the Ultimatum game is that
it allows us to gather more data about intentions of players. In this particular game the respondent
offers a strategy of responses (accept, reject) for each of the possible offers by the first player.
This is particularly important because offers by the first player seem to show a high frequency of
fair offers and rejection rates are quite small. Fairness is a very powerful motivator in the
Ultimatum game, as shown in replications of the game in different cultural settings. In Cardenas
and Carpenter (2003) we gather a set of results from studies using this game in different
countries, including the sample by Henrich et.al (2001). From a sample of 21 UG games, the
mean proposal by player one is almost 40% of their initial endowments, a standard deviation of
0.0761, a minimum mean offer of 26% and a maximum of 58%. The mean of the mean rejection
rates for this same sample is of 10.7% (Std.Dev=0.1101).
But a more careful look at strategies by respondents, and comparisons of UG data between
subject pools can offer some interesting results. Bahry and Wilson (2003) find in a set of the UG
with the strategy method run in two former soviet republics, Tatarstan and Sakha, that
respondents, reject unfair offers but also offers that unfair to player one making the offers. Most
offers divided the initial endowment in half. The authors argue that such strong norm of equality
might be the residual of the Soviet era.
I conducted the same UG under the strategy method in a small village in the Pacific coast of
Colombia where no residual effect of such political regimes can be argued to have existed, and
also found the same pattern of rejecting offers that were unfair to either player. However, when
we replicated the exact same design and payoffs with college students in Bogotá, such hyper-10 In this design players participated in both DG and UG in sequence. They had the same role (player
one or respondent) in both games, but results of the DG were known to players two only after the two games were
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Figure 2. Dictator offers (Left panels) and Ultimatum offers (right). Top panels show data for
students and bottom panels for villagers.
fairness vanished. 
Figure 2 shows the frequencies of offers by players and students in the UG and in Dictator
games
10. The left panels show offers in the Dictator game and the right panels the offers for the
Ultimatum. The top panels show the offers by students and the bottom ones for villagers. Clearly
students were more likely to send very low offers in both cases, and the few cases in which11 In the case of the DG, offers added to Col$141,000 for villagers and only Col$74,000 for students.





































$0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10




Figure 3. Acceptance rates in the Ultimatum game (strategy
method) for students and villagers.
players send offers above 50% occurred only for the villagers who in general showed a more
frequent offer of an equal split.
Data about respondents’ strategies also show some contrasts. In Figure 3 I show the frequency of
acceptance of offers in the strategies by all players and compare students to villagers as well.
Students were more likely to accept offers that were unfair to player 1, consistent with the hyper-
fairness argument (Bahry and Wilson, 2003). But also notice that villagers were also more likely
to accept unfair offers to them. Aggregate earnings overall, however, resulted higher in the case
of this village than for the students pool because there were significantly more fair offers in the
Pacific coast
11.
Follow-up questions, debriefings and conversations with the villagers showed interesting15
explanations for such paradoxical results. Players 2 who would accept very low offers argued that
players were entitled to make the offer, because God, their conscience, or their good luck
justified so, and that they should be entitled to keep what they wanted. Meanwhile, players who
would reject offers very unfair to player one, argued that they would not feel good that such thing
happened since being player two should not give them the right to keep more money than player
one. In general a sense of deservedness justified the strategy chosen. In the case of students the
arguments where more similar to a self-oriented notion of fairness and efficiency as expressed in
the follow-up questions.
For a few cases in the Pacific coast, some respondents who would accept low offers argued that
they would do it also because it would ensure that the money stayed in the village and not being
brought back to Bogotá by the researcher. This opens the question of meta-games where
researchers and their externally brought money may play a more active role in the experiments. 
However, the lower acceptance of very high offers would contradict such rationale. I will get
back to this issue of meta-games later on as it makes part of the framework proposed.
b. Another puzzle: Cooperation and face-to-face communication in the campus and
the field labs.
The original work by Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994) on Common-Pool Resources opened a
major area of experimental research. Replication of similar experiments in the field has
confirmed, among other results, the basic finding that under a non cooperative game setting in
which players cannot communicate with each other and where decisions remain private and
confidential, average decisions do not confirm the prediction of rent dissipation or the so called
“tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968), neither they achieve a socially optimal solution. A
major part of the literature on CPR and VCM experiments also suggests that if the game is
repeated, a significant fraction of players are willing to cooperate in the initial stages, but that








































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Rounds (No Communication)
Students Villagers
Figure 4. Group extraction during the first 10 rounds (no-
communication) for students and for villagers.
negative reciprocity induces those same players to start increasing their level of appropriation of
the common-pool, or for the case of public goods, they reduce their individual contributions
(OGW, 1994; Ledyard, 1995).
Our replication in the field lab of a group dilemma such as these, with a design of two stages of
10 rounds each, and groups of 5 players who must decide their individual level of extraction of a
common-pool (choices are between 1 and 8 units) offers also confirmation of these findings. In
our design the social optimum solution occurs when every player chooses 1 unit of extraction and
the symmetric Nash equilibrium prediction is when every player chooses her maximum allowed
extraction, i.e 8 units. The data for a set of 173 sessions with 865 villagers and replications in 46
sessions with 230 students, during the first 10 rounds of the same incentives, experimental
institution and environment, shows that in average, the group outcome confirms similar results
from the campus lab, although the decay in cooperation (increase in appropriation in our case) is12 These 219 sessions were conducted, for the first 10 rounds exactly equally. The sample was then
divided in different treatments for the second stage of the game where we introduced different insstitutions on self-
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Figure 5. Distribution of individual decisions during first stage (no
communication), 10 rounds, students vs villagers. Wilcoxon Mann-
Whitney z-value=12.919, p-value=0.000)
not as severe as in other works
12. Figure 4 shows the average of the aggregate (group) extraction
levels for both students and villagers. Recall that if all players follow the prediction of the Nash
equilibrium the total extraction should be of 40 units, while the social optimum would be
achieved if the total extraction was of 5 units. The difference, although significant statistically
(Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney z-value=11.046, p-value=0.000) for the group extraction across
subject polls, shows similar patterns with a shift towards higher extraction for students.
However, a look at the individual level data, and a look at the evolution of decisions over time
may offer some interesting insights. 
As shown in figure 5 with the distribution of individual decisions for the same sample, the
students data suggests a unimodal skewed distribution where most of the decisions approach the
Nash equilibrium prediction and fewer decisions are closer to the lower extraction levels.
Meanwhile, the data from the field experiments suggests a bimodal distribution where there are
two peaks, one closer to the cooperation level and another close to the maximum extraction. This13 In this sense there is a difference with the classical common-pool resource design (OGW, 1994;
Cardenas et.al, 2000) where interior solutions do not produce a dominant strategy. However, this design shares with
the common-pool design the non-linearity of the payoffs surface while the linear public goods involve a constant
marginal returns from free-riding, while such rate is decreasing in this and the classical commons case.
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difference yielded a higher level of group and individual earnings for the villagers. A look at the
evolution of such distributions over rounds (Figure 6) shows that students seem to behave much
closer to previous experimental work with students, with an increasing number of decisins
towards the highest level of extraction. However the right panel of the figure shows how the data
from the villagers is, if we can say, noisier and more difficult to analyze. Although the frequency
of decisions that are closer to the maximum extraction in this case seems to be significant, it is
also the fraction of decisions that are closer to the social optimum levels.
Debriefing of decision making with the villagers suggests that there was a permanent tension
within the mind of many between trying to reduce extraction to see earnings increase, and
responding with higher extraction levels when they observed that the rest of the group was
increasing theirs. However, it is also interesting, looking at the individual groups data, that there
seems to be an upper threshold of aggregate extraction that induces an immediate reduction by
the majority of players without any coordination or communication during this first stage. Notice
that increasing individual extraction, at any level of group extraction, is a dominant strategy in
this experimental design
13. It is the case also that a lower threshold also induced most players to
increase their extraction when the level of cooperation was sufficiently high as the gains from
free-riding seemed higher.
The familiarity with the task, discussed earlier in the paper, also suggests that a significant
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Figure 6. Evolution of the distribution of decisions
over time. Students vs Villagers, first stage, 10
rounds, no communication.14 The comparable sample for these 3 villages included a total of 80 sessions in the first visit (400
participants), and 32 sessions during the second visit (160 participants). The comparison is for the data from the 10
rounds in the first stage.
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Figure 7. Distribution of decisions (level of extraction), 10 rounds, no-communication, for same
3 villages during first visit (left) and second visit (right).
c. The puzzle of re-visiting the same village: meta-games or social norms learning?
The available funding for this research allowed us to return to some villages we had visited in
previous months under another project, three in particular, and replicate the same experiments
and explore other treatments. Comparing such new data set with the same design, and for the
same 10 initial rounds, shows some striking results that enrich our discussion about an expanded
microeconomic system in which local dynamics outside of the field lab may play key roles in our
analysis. Elsewhere (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2003) we discuss in more detail such findings and
their implications regarding the use of experimental methods for interventions, and development
in general. Here let me just compare the data from the first and the second visit for these three
villages
14, and discuss the implications within the scope of this paper.
The following Figure 7 shows the distribution of decisions for all three villages during the first
10 rounds where no communication was allowed. The left panel shows the data for those three
villages during the first visit, and the right panel shows the distribution for the same design in the15 The second visit occurred 6, 15 and 20 months later for the three villages. The length of time
between visits does not seem to explain the differences.
16 The recruitment for the second visit was made under the same manner, and when asked if people
that had been in the first time was allowed, we agreed but also encouraged other people to also come.
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same villages for the second visit
15. The difference in distributions deserves some discussion.
Clearly during the second visit there was a norm or rule of thumb for these players. In fact a
closer look at the data along rounds, right from the beginning of round 1 this type of distribution
appeared, and was sustained along this first stage of the game. It was only in round 10, as usually
found in the last round effect, the peak to the right of the graph decreased shifting to a larger
fraction of free-riding decisions, looking closet to a uniform distribution.
As we usually do, couple days later we conducted community workshops in these three villages
and discussed such radical change in decisions. The consensus was that “they now knew how to
play the game”, which by the way they knew from the first visit as the debriefings showed how
players had understood the structure of the incentives by the end of the experiments. Thus, one
could argue that what they knew this second time is that “trust and cooperation could be
sustained and would be profitable” and that “cheap talk”, outside of the lab, does produce effects
before coming into the lab.
A second argument in favor that such norms emerged not only within the rationale of the players
(individual learning) but within the village (group learning), emerges from comparing the data
for the participants who had been in both visits with those who came to the second visit for their
first time
16. In Figure 8 there are the two frequency distributions for the two sub-samples,
showing that the distribution of strategies were similar regardless of whether the had the
individual learning or the group learning.17 Personal communication.
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Figure 8. Distribution of decisions (extraction), first 10 rounds no-communication. Left panel:
people that did not participate in the first visit, right panel: experienced players.
An alternative explanation, although not mutually exclusive with the previous one, has been
suggested by Andreas Ortmann
17 associated with the debate over meta-games where the
experimenter, by bringing external money, becomes a player in the game. His argument is that
once the rumor in the village spread about a second round of experiments, people would rapidly
distribute the rule of thumb of choosing low levels of extraction to make sure more money from
the researcher remained in the village. 
Further, argues Ortmann, given that the experience during the first visit is that despite the
promise kept by the researcher to maintain decisions private, many people shared information
about their decisions, fear from being discovered choosing fee-riding strategies given the group
norm being spread, would impose great costs to such players. Notice the specially high incentives
for those “experienced” players once they have heard the spread rule of thumb to choose low
levels of extraction in the second visit. However the data suggest that strategies across
experienced and fresh participants in the second visit is distributed very similarly.23
I would argue that such explanations do not rule out the possibility of the individual and group
learning of cooperative or prosocial norms as part of the expanded microsystem proposed.
Basically the pre-commitment before the experiments started, even if only instrumentally for
reaping more cash from the experimenter, shows to be effective along with the cost of social
punishment outside of the lab -but within the extended microsystem, which illustrate how groups
device self-governed mechanisms to produce collective action.
5. Conclusions and the research ahead.
This paper has emerged from a set of phenomena observed by the author in the last few years of
running experiments in the field, and from the increasing literature on experimental work in the
field. The intention has been to derive lessons for researchers in both campus and field labs, so
that we can understand better what we observe on behavior and outcomes as a result of designing
and controlling for institutions and environmental conditions in our experiments. The need to
continue strengthening the internal and external validity of experimental economics is the main
justification for the effort, and given that there are still variations in the experimental and field
data to be explained by our models in many settings of economic and social exchange.
A major proposal along the paper is to expand our basic microeconomic system (Smith, 1982)
into a more complete one -which I have labeled Expanded Micro-Economic System- that
encompasses information that may flow as a result of participants bringing their own prior
experience, rules, norms, prejudices and other information that could be used strategically within
the lab, as well as information that may flow from the lab to the outside field, and which may
influence the decision-making as well as a result of players’ expectations about the effects of
their decisions outside of the lab, which might be significant at least for the case of experiments
run in the field. Such expansion of the microsystem can also involve our campus labs, as students
also bring elements from outside the lab to help in their rationality and task. Experiments in
which there are less risk and uncertainty or less conflict between one’s preferences and18 In Cardenas and Carpenter (2003) we discuss in more detail the few systematic evidence available
on studying the question of experienced vs fresh students. This should be also matter of careful research, and in the
same line of research suggested here, it would benefit if those students were more actively involved in the discussion
of how their evolving rationality and rules of thumb when returning to the lab for one more session.
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consequences to others, such as competitive markets e.g. double-auctions, there will probably be
less information used by the players to guide their experimental decision-making.
In summary, the paper offers a set of evidence suggesting that players, students or not-students,
bring elements of information to guide their decision, and such information can be about their
individual, group or context characteristics. Examples mentioned here include cultural
background, group identity, gender, prior experience, wealth or social status, all of which come
from the outside of the experiment, and enter to the environment (E) and institutions (I) that our
experimental microsystem involves. Further, there might be information (messages) that our
experimental microsystem sends to outside of the lab, and that can provide additional
information to participants when entering the experiment either as ex-ante information or in
future participation in similar or different experiments
18. Thus, instructions individuals use in the
experiment include not only what researchers read to them, but ‘instructions’ they have read
before coming into the lab. How they combine them remains unsolved.
At least three major future research questions result from bringing the experimental lab to the
field and which might become interesting areas of inquiry in the coming future. 
One emerges from the fact that people we invite to participate in our experiments bring into the
lab important information that they combine with the experimental institutions (I) and
environmental (E) variables we induce in our design. How much of the external I and E they
leave out of the field lab, and how much they use into their decision making should be matter of
research. We need to continue designing tools to separate and study external and lab factors that
explain behavior, particularly if they are confounded in people` s decisions in the lab. Framing of
experiments can be enhancing or contradicting with what the actual context of the players is.
Such was the case with the experiments in the People’s Republic of China (Cooper et.al, 1999)19 Let me give you an example of how we need to establish dialogues between participants and
researchers to better understand not only behavior and outcomes but also experimental designs. Abigail Barr
(personal communication), in her experiments on risk pooling in Zimbabwe, had to drop the mechanism of flipping a
coin to decide which option in a lottery would be awarded to each player, because women do not know how to flip a
coin like men do and therefore argued it would not provide a fair toss.
20 Such invitation should be made, I would argue, after the experimental sessions were concluded and
either at random or as a voluntary activity once the researcher has a fair idea of certain patterns in the data and
remaining questions.
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where the managers who faced instructions framed as a planned economy for firms decisions,
they chose more strategic actions.
A second lesson for those interested in field experimental work emerges from the fact that our
participants may well be part of the research analysis as they possess private information
researchers do not have about their lab behavior, as well as their field behavior, and that cannot
be fully observed in the behavior they show in the experiment
19. Even in the case of campus labs,
students participating in experiments could become part of the research process, provided that a
well controlled design and assuring the privacy of decisions do not induce certain strategic
behavior by participants ex-ante, based on their expectations about participating in the discussion
and the revealing of certain information that may impose social costs such as we have observed
in the field
20.
This brings a third line of inquiry suggested here, that of meta-games where experimenters
become players in the game as their bringing endowments of research cash induces certain
strategic behavior that might not happen if such external resources were not brought from
outside. The concern on what kind of role experimenters may play in these experiments is still an
open question. Although Frank (1998) reports that the experimenter effect in UG might not exist,
when he compared cases in which he burned in front of players payoffs not earned to the control
case, there is still room for players being influenced by other possibilities for an experimenter
effect. For instance, participants may assume that researchers can link behavior data to
individuals within a certain group where they play a certain role, or there are possibilities for21 Abigail Barr (personal communication) has shared these same concerns based on
her experimental work in Africa.
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players assuming that the field experimental data may have a future use for government or donor
agencies now that the notion of social capital for development has become central
21. Further,
many of the experimenters working in rural areas have maintained or plan to maintain a long run
relationship with the communities which may impose a supra-level set of non-material incentives
that must not be at least ignored in our analysis.
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